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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE AZMINISTRATION
TECHNICAL NOTE D-1627
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF ALTIMETER-SYSTEMACCURACY
ON COLLISION PROBABILITY
By William Gracey
SUMMARY
The probability of collision between two airplanes has been determined for
their normal assignment to adjacent flight levels and for their very rare mis-
assignment to the same flight level. Collision probabilities were computed for
a flight-level separation minimum of _00 feet, airplane vertical dimensions of
20 and _0 feet, altitude-misassignment probabilities of 1/lO0,O00 and 1/1,O00,000,
and altimeter-system errors (Sa values) ranging from 0 to 2,000 feet.
The results of the analysis showed that minimum collision probabilities
occurred at altimeter-system errors of about 200 feet, and that for altimeter-
system errors from _O0 to 2,000 feet, the collision probability was several
orders of magnitude greater than that for altimeter-system errors of 250 feet
or less.
INTRODUCTION
The amount by which an airplane deviates from an assigned flight level, that
is, its vertical-displacement error_ depends on the altimeter-system error (com-
bined statlc-pressure and altimeter errors) and on the flight technical error
(random deviations from stabilized cruise altitude (ref. 1)). The probability of
collision between two airplanes flying adjacent flight levels depends, therefore,
on their vertical displacement errors and, in addition, on (1) the size of the
airplanes, (2) the flight-level separation minimum, (5) the lateral displacement
of the airplanes, and (4) the collision exposure time. The collision exposure
time can vary from very small to very large values depending on the direction of
flight of the two airplanes; if they are flying in the same direction, the expo-
sure time becomes a function of the longitudinal separation and the relative
speeds of the airplanes.
In a study performed by the Federal Aviation Agency in 1961, the relation-
ship between collision probability and vertical-displacement error was determined
for the case of two airplanes assigned to adjacent flight levels. More recently,
questions have been raised regarding the relation between altimeter-system errors
and collision probability for the case where airplanes, through an error on the
part of the ground controller, are assigned to the same flight level. The
possibility of altitude misassignments poses a conflicting problem with regard to
altimeter-system accuracy in that the small errors which would prevent collision
between airplanes assigned to adjacent flight levels would increase the proba-
bility of collision if the airplanes were misassigned to the sameflight level.
To provide an answer to this problem3 an analysis has been madeto determine the
effect of altimeter-system accuracy on the probability of collision between two
airplanes for the case of assignment to adjacent flight levels or misassignment
to the sameflight level. In this analysis the probabilities of collision were
computedon the assumption that the airplanes were located along a vertical line.
SYMBOLS
h
S
Pm
P132333. •.n
Pc S
Pc a
Pc
standard deviation of altimeter-system error
vertical dimension of airplane
flight-level separation minimum
altitude misassignment probability
probability of the altimeter-system error being within error incre-
ments numbered 13 23 3, • . n, equal to the corresponding area
of the increment under a normal curve
collision probability for two airplanes assigned to same flight level
collision probability for two airplanes assigned to adjacent flight
levels
total collision probability for two airplanes assigned to same flight
level or to adjacent flight levels, Pcs +Pca
ANALYSIS
The method of analysis used in the present study is based on the assumption
that the altimeter-system errors of all airplanes have a normal distribution.
For amy one airplane3 therefore, the probability that the error of its altimeter
system will be within a given error increment can be determined from the corre-
sponding area under a normal curve; these incremental areas are readil_ deter-
mined from tables of probability developed for this type of distribution.
The application of normal curves to the determination of collision proba-
bilities is illustrated in figure 1. Shown in this figure are normal curves rep-
resenting the altimeter-system error distribution for two airplanes assigned to
flight levels separated by a distanee S (fig. l(a)) and for two airplanes
assigned to the same flight level (fig. l(b)). The altimeter-system error scales
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(a) Two airplanes assigned to adjacent flight levels.
Figure 1.- Diagram of method for calculating collision probabilities for two airplanes assigned to
adjacent flight levels or to the same flight level.
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of each of the curves are divided into increments equal to the vertical dimen-
sion h of the airplanes. This dimension h represents the largest error
increment within which collision between the two airplanes is certain to occur
since the values of h are assumed to be equal for the two airplanes. For the
illustrative example shown in figure i, h is an even increment of S; however,
it is not essential that this be the case for the application of the method.
As can be seen from figure i, collision will occur when the altimeter-system
errors of the two airplanes fall within intersecting or corresponding error
increments at the same time. For example, for the case of the two airplanes
assigned to adjacent flight levels, the probability that the error of one air-
plane will fall within increment 4 is represented by the area of that increment
and may be designated P4; similarly, the probability that the error of the other
airplane will fall within intersecting increment 6 is represented by the area of
that segment and may be designated P6" The probability that the errors of the
airplanes will fall within these increments simultaneously is equal to the prod-
uct of the two error-increment probabilities or P4P6 • For the case of the two
airplanes assigned to the same flight level, the collision probability for a
given error increment is equal to the product of the probabilities (i.e., areas)
of corresponding error increments. For example, for error increment i_ the col-
lision probability would be the product of the two error increment probabilities
PI_ that is, P12.
In the illustration in figure l(a) the collision probability, Pca for
the two airplanes assigned to adjacent flight levels is the sum of the collision
probabilities of error segments 4, 5, and 6 and is equal to P52 + 2P4P 6. For
the case of two airplanes assigned to the same flight level (fig. l(b)) the col-
lision probability Pcs is determined not only by the sum of the collision
probabilities of the corresponding error increments but also by the probability
of the two airplanes being assigned to the same flight level, that is, the
altitude-misassignment probability Pm. For the case illustrated in figure i,
therefore_ the collision probability, Pcs, is equal to
(P12 + 2222 + 2p32 + 2P42 + 2P52 + 2P62)Pm . With the introduction of Pm, the
value of Pc a should, to be exact, be multiplied by the factor (i - Pm); how-
ever, since the value of Pm is extremely small, the factor (i - Pm) can be
considered unity with negligible error.
The total collision probability Pc for a given set of values of _, h,
S, and Pm is the sum of the collision probabilities for the two cases of air-
planes assigned to adjacent flight levels or misassigned to the same flight
level, that is, Pc =Pca + Pc s"
In the present study, S is assigned a value of 500 feet (the flight-
level separation minimum specified for combined IFR (Instrument Flight Rules)
and VFR (Visual Flight Rules) operations in the s/titude range below
29,000 feet). Values of 20 and 40 feet were assigned to the airplane vertical
dimension h, since 20 feet can be considered representative of the vertical
dimension of medium-size airplane and 40 feet represents the approximate vertical
dimension of the largest of present-day turbojet transports. Values of i/i00,000
and I/i, OO0,000were assigned to the a!titude-misassignment probability Pm
because the rate at which altitude misassignments occur in present-day operations
is estimated to fall within the range of these values; this estimate is based on
an approximation of the numberof altitude assignments per year in the United
States and on information relating to near-miss incidents and ground controller
error reported in Project Scan (ref. 2). For the values of S, h, and Pm
noted above, collision probabilities Pc were computedfor altimeter-system
errors which, expressed as )a values (that is, values within which the prob-
ability is 99.7 percent), ranged from 0 to 2,000 feet.
In the present analysis, the assumption is madethat the airplanes fly their
indicated altitudes exactly, that is, flight technical errors are zero. In addi-
tion, it is assumedthat the two airplanes are located along the samevertical
line, that is, the effects of lateral separation and collision exposure time are
not included.
RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
The results of the analysis are presented in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2
showsthe variation of collision probability Pc with altimeter-system error
(3_ values) up to 300 feet; variations are presented for four combinations of
airplane vertical dimension h and altitude-misassignment probability Pm' In
figure 3, one of the curves in figure 2 has been extended through a range of
altimeter-system errors up to 2,000 feet.
It should be noted that the Pc scales in figures 2 and 3 are logarithmic
and that the scale of figure 3 is compressedwith respect to that of figure 2.
Since, as noted earlier, the values for Pc were computedon the assumption
that the airplanes were located along a vertical line, these values would be
reduced if the probabilities for lateral separation and collision exposure time
were included. Thus, although the values of Pc do not represent collision
probabilities for the general case of collision occurrence, the values are valid
for the purpose of showing the relative effects of variations of _, h, and Pm.
The curves in figure 2 showthat the collision probability decreases as the
altimeter-system error approaches values somewhatless than 250 feet or one-half
the flight-level separation minimum; the collision probabilities in this range
of altimeter-system errors are determined solely by the probability of collision
of the two airplanes whenthey are assigned to the sameflight level. At higher
values of altimeter-system errors, the collision probability increases rapidly(because of the probabilities of collision when the two airplanes are assigned
to adjacent flight levels) and, as shownin figure 3, reaches a peak value at an
altimeter-system error of about 1,000 feet or twice the flight-level separation
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Figure 2.- Variation of collision probability wlth altimeter-system error (up to 300 feet) for two
airplanes assigned to the same flight level or to flight levels 500 feet apart; values of Pc
apply to collision along a vertical line only, i.e., the probabilities for lateral separation
and collision exposure time are not included.
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Figure 3-- Variation of collision probability with altlmeter-system error (up to 2jO00 feet) for two
airplanes assigned to the same flight level or to flight levels 900 feet apart; values of Pc
apply to collision along a vertical line only_ i.e._ the probabilities for lateral separation and
collision exposure time are not included, h = 40 feet; Pm = i/l_O00jO00.
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minimum. Despite the decrease in collision probability beyond this point_ the
collision probabilities for a range of altimeter-system errors of from one to as
high as four times the separation minimum are several orders of magnitude greater
than the collision probabilities for system errors less than one-half the separa-
tion minimum.
As shown in figure 2, minimum collision probabilities occur at altimeter-
system errors ranging from about 195 feet (for the 40-foot airplane vertical
dimension.) to about 210 feet (for the 20-foot airplane vertical dimension). For
the values of Pm and h considered in this analysis, therefore, the value of
the altimeter-system error for minimum collision probability is unaffected by
changes in Pm and affected to only a small extent by changes in h. From a con-
sideration of these results_ it might appear that a minimum collision probability
could be realized if altimeter-system errors (3_ values) were on the order of
200 feet. As noted earlier, however_ the altimeter-system error is only a part of
the vertical-displacement error of an airplane and for actual operations the
flight technical error must also be tsken into account.
Some preliminary information on the flight technical error has recently
been acquired from operations of 13 turbine-powered transports in the altitude
range from sea level to 40,000 feet. These data have shown that for flight under
autopilot (altitude-hold) control, the random deviations from cruise altitude
were less than i00 to 250 feet for 99.7 percent of the cruise time. For opera-
tions of two of the airplanes under manual control, the altitude deviations were
found to be about 350 feet. On the basis of this information, the 3a value of
flight technical error would be expected to be generally on the order of
200 feet. As this value is about the same as that computed in the present study
for minimum collision probability, the altimeter-system error would have to
approach zero if the vertical-displacement error is not to exceed a value of
200 feet. Since zero or near-zero altimeter-system errors are not within the
present state of the art of altimetry, however, the flight technical error would
have to be reduced to a value less than 200 feet if minimum collision probability
is to be realized with present-day altimeter systems. If_ for example 3 the
flight technical error could be reduced to 150 feet (by maximum use of autopilot
control and minimum operation under manual control), the altimeter-system error
could have a value of 90 feet and still produce a combined value for the vertical
displacement error of 200 feet (since the combined value is the square root of
the sum of the squares of the two individual errors). Although the errors of the
uncorrected altimeter systems of many present-day airplanes are greater than
90 feet, altimeter-system errors of this order of magnitude can be achieved by
applying corrections for the static-pressure and instrument errors by means of
correction cards or by the use of static-pressure compensators and altimeter
scale-error correctors.
CONCLUDING R_MARKS
The variation of collision probability with altimeter-system error has been
computed for two airplanes assigned to adjacent flight levels or misassigned to
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the same flight level. For a flight-level separation minimum of 500 feet, air-
plane vertical dimensions of 20 and 40 feet_ and altitude-misassignment prob-
abilities of i/i00,000 and i/i,000, 000, minimum collision probabilities were
found to occur at s_Itimeter-system errors (30 values) of about 200 feet. For
altimeter-system errors from 500 to 2,000 feet_ the collision probability was
several orders of magnitude greater than that for altimeter-system errors less
than 250 feet.
Langley Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Langley Station, Hampton, Va., January 18, 1963.
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